ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE NEW JERSEY HOUSING & JOBS INITIATIVE

Report to the Affordable Housing Network

Project Community
Center for Urban Policy Research

December 21, 1995

AFFORDABLE HOUSING



This part of the report concerns the first three elements of the Initiative: the Affordable Housing Development Fund, the Project-Based Rental Subsidy Program, and the Homeownership Fund. The need for these three components are described next, followed by a discussion of the impacts expected to be generated by each.

New Jersey’s Affordable Housing Needs

New Jersey has an affordable housing crisis which is characterized by high demand, low production, inability to house people on fixed incomes without subsidies, and barriers to home ownership for low-and moderate-income would-be buyers. The state estimates 85,000 to 100,000 affordable units are needed by 1999 due to high rents, overcrowding, and substandard conditions.4 The current supply is threatened by aging and neglect. One out of every two units is over thirty-five years old, and one of every four is more than fifty-five years old.5 60,280 units are listed as substandard.6

Affordable housing production is insufficient. Between 1987 and 1992, only 13,281 units were developed, an average of 2,800 units per year.7 The successful state-run Neighborhood Preservation Balanced Housing Program (BHP), which provides construction subsidies, is too underfunded to fulfill its mandate.

Low-income levels combined with high housing costs make most housing unaffordable for New Jersey’s working poor and those on public assistance. Over half of these very low-income households (defined as having income below 30 percent of area median income), spend more than 50 percent of their income on rent.8 This burden can be illustrated by comparing the incomes of minimum wage workers and area rents. A minimum wage employee earns only $10,500 a year ($5.05 per hour), or 22 percent of the median. The average Fair Market Rent (FMR) established by HUD for a two-bedroom unit in New Jersey is $820 a month,9 almost equal to the minimum wage earner’s entire gross income. A full-time worker would need to earn at least $33,072 a year ($15.90 per hour) to afford this rent at 30 percent of income. For poor families on federal public assistance grants, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the housing situation is worse. In 1994, New Jersey was rated worst in the nation for "three-person shortfalls," the income gap between the level of AFDC provided to three-member households and the rent needed to afford a two-bedroom unit at FMR.10 Many minimum wage workers and public assistance recipients are forced to pay very high percentages of their incomes for housing, leaving little money for other necessities.

The availability of subsidized housing, such as federal Section 8 project-based and tenant-based rental assistance, is very limited. Just 13.5 percent of the state’s low- and moderate-income households live in HUD-assisted housing.11 The New Jersey Department of Community Affairs (DCA) waiting list for Section 8 subsidy was 28,000 households as of 1994, a mere fraction of the tens of thousands of families on similar lists maintained by the 106 housing authorities in New Jersey.12

Without a project-based subsidy to reduce operating costs, even affordable units developed by community-based organizations cannot lower rents to serve the very poor. Most grants available for affordable housing, such as Balanced Housing, HOME, and CDBG, are used to offset construction costs. Grants to reduce operating expenses are hard to obtain. The experience from units built through the Balanced Housing Program has shown that it costs, on average, $300 a month plus another $100 a month for utilities to operate a unit, assuming there is no debt on the building. This rent is higher than someone on minimum wage or a fixed income can afford. Without some form of operating subsidy, even the lowest level rents are affordable to is only 40 percent of the median, which excludes the very poor.13

Ironically, those wait-listed AFDC and SSI cost-burdened households, which do not receive assistance through Section 8 and voucher programs, often wind up in Emergency Assistance placements, at greater public cost. Much money is spent on inadequate placements in hotel/shelters to house very low-income families who have become homeless. An average of 453 homeless families per month were placed in these facilities between October 1993 and September 1994, at a monthly cost of almost $700,000.14 State and local governments paid half the expense.

The high cost of housing in New Jersey, coupled with lagging incomes, has made the dream of attaining homeownership difficult for the state’s residents.15 The average price of a home in New Jersey in 1990 was $162,300, more than double the national average of $79,100 and almost three and one-half times the state median income.16 The "affordability gap" was even wider for Hispanic and Black families, which had incomes in 1990 of only two-thirds of the state median ($30,000 and $29,145 respectively). The median housing price was almost five and one-half times the median income for these minority families.17

Affordable Housing Development Fund

The largest component of the Initiative would allocate $160 million for an Affordable Housing Development Fund which would provide grants, loans, and other forms of assistance to create at least 4,500 units of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income households. This fund is beneficial because it will move the state forward in addressing the need for this type of housing while creating significant benefits for New Jersey’s economy.

Methodology in Determining Economic Multiplier Effects

The impacts generated by the $160 million Affordable Housing Development Fund on the state’s economy were calculated using the PC I-O input-output model.18 Based on 525 industries, this model calculated the economic multiplier effects this fund would have on jobs, state and local revenues, and overall business activity.19 Several assumptions were made in regards to calculating the fund’s effects and its overall expected impacts.

Since the fund would be administered in a way similar to the BHP, a survey was conducted with thirty-two developers who used BHP funding to determine how this fund would operate. It was assumed, based on the survey results, that 71% of the construction funding would be used for new construction and the remainder for rehabilitation of existing housing.

In addition, it was assumed that the fund’s expenditure would leverage a range of capital from outside sources depending upon whether the leveraging level, based on previous BHP experience, held or was reduced. If the fund’s usage follows the historical leveraging pattern of the BHP, the rate would be higher. In the past, the BHPs construction subsidies have averaged about $14,000 per unit for new construction and $23,000 for substantial rehabilitation. This generated about four dollars from other funding sources for each one dollar of BHP capital (1:4 ratio). Changes in regulations will allow the average BHP grant to rise to an average of $35,000 per unit.20 The leveraging rate may not keep pace under the increased subsidy because of the finite nature of outside funding sources, such as foundations. It was assumed, then, that the leveraging rate could be reduced to $2.50 from other sources for every $1 of AHDF expenditure (1:2.5 ratio). The fund’s impacts therefore were calculated using both the lower ratio of 1:2.5 (assuming leveraging may fall) and at the higher rate of 1:4 (if the previous pattern is matched).

Lastly, an assumption was made regarding the production period to complete the first 4,500 housing units. Allowing for some normal lag time between issuance of the bond and start-up, it is expected that the units will be completed over a five year period, beginning with Year 3 of the fund. From Years 3 to 7 of the fund, 900 units are expected to be finished annually.

Impacts

The Affordable Housing Development Fund’s impacts will be substantial: new jobs, new revenues to local and state government, and overall increased economic activity. Highlights of these impacts (assuming leveraging) are as follows and are further described in Table 1.21

Table 1: Economic Impacts of the Affordable Housing Development Fund

ImpactsLeveraging 1:2.5 Leveraging 1:4Public Expenditure22
Employment (jobs)5,955 9,528 2,382
Personal Income $243,796,000 $390,073,600 $97,518,400
State Taxes (one-time) $19,617,500 $31,388,000 $7,847,000
Local Taxes (one-time) $20,435,750 $32,697,200 $8,174,300
Local Taxes (annual) $8,000,000 $12,800,000 $3,200,000
Value-added to State Economy $316,553,000 $506,484,800 $126,621,200

Employment

The employment expected to be created by the AHDF will range from 5,955 jobs23 at the lower leveraging ratio to 9,528 jobs if the leveraging follows its higher historical rate. The jobs created will last for the duration of the housing production period. The actual number of workers hired to fill these positions will depend upon how many contractors are used. The maximum employment period should occur in Years 3 - 5 of the fund when all phases of housing production are fully underway. Based on the historical pattern of projects receiving BHP funding, ninety-five percent of the workers on the construction projects are expected to be state residents. Higher percentages of state residents increase aggregate personal income and tax revenues generated.

Impacts from the employment will be felt across several industries and among various skill levels of the workforce. Construction will be the most affected industry, with an employment gain ranging from 2,413 to 3,861 jobs24 (e.g., specialized construction trades positions, laborers and administrative support). From 2,800 to 4,440 other positions will be divided among three industries (employment ranges in parentheses): retail trade (974 to 1,558), services (917 to 1,468), and manufacturing (884 to 1,414). Other industries will gain a combined total ranging from 766 to 1,226 jobs.25

Several occupations will particularly benefit from this fund, encompassing a scope of job skill levels (see Table 2). From 4,419 to 7,068 jobs, or more than two-thirds of the positions created, will be in four occupational categories. High-skilled positions in the precision production category (including the construction trades and other specialized mechanical work) will gain the most. Management positions will also be created. Following the precision production category will be medium- and low-skilled jobs among the operators, fabricators and laborers category, and administrative support and service areas. Some of the kinds of jobs to be created in these categories include: