

ethics (p. 122) because of its still-revolutionary claim that human reason, without any supernatural assistance, can find and establish the supreme principle of morality. Philosophy, Kant assures his readers, can be firm even though there is “nothing in heaven or earth” upon which it depends. Merely by reflecting upon common sense (in Section I), or ethical rational knowledge (in Section II), he eliminates corrupt or misleading conceptions of morality to arrive at its true principle. In its final formulation, the principle states that man is “subject to his own and yet universal legislation.” Here, Shell says that Kant boldly argues that human beings can make and observe moral laws without divine revelation or support: “One could say that Kant put individual ‘autonomy’ on the map” (p. 2). One could also say, more polemically, that Kant granted philosophic legitimacy and prestige to atheism.

Human beings need (Christian) religion. Late Kant (1789–98) was obsessed with the question of the aspects of Christianity that were necessary for, compatible with, or opposed to moral autonomy. In a chapter on “Kant’s Jewish Problem,” Shell shows that Kant’s fondness for his Jewish students (such as Marcus Herz) and respect for Judaism’s prohibition on graven images (in the *Critique of Judgment*) turned, near the end of his life and under pressure from the Prussian religious-political establishment, to contempt for Jewish ceremonialism. In the *Conflict of the Faculties*, Kant argues that Catholicism and Protestantism, despite minor historical differences, nurture a pure moral faith that insists, for instance, that Jesus (and not Moses) personifies the moral ideal. Kant’s call for pure rational religion becomes, in effect, a call for a Christianity purified of Judaism. His religious writings “suggest a thought that Fichte and other members of the Christlich-Deutschen Tischgesellschaft will run with: de-judaization as the negative image of the republican idea” (p. 328). Shell notes that Kant helped launch Fichte’s career; she discretely passes over the fact that Hitler was a devoted reader of Fichte.

What lessons does Shell draw from Kant’s thoughts on autonomy? The first is that there is a limit to philosophy’s explanatory power. Despite Kant’s best efforts (as in Section III of the *Groundlaying*), he never could specify exactly what legislates in human reason, or where reason origi-

nates: “Kant, in short, admits that morality has a mysterious core” (p. 4). This is an amazing statement. Mystery derives from the Greek word *mysterion* (“secret rite or doctrine”), from the verb *myein* (“to close, shut”), as in: the initiates to a mystery are not permitted to speak about it. The Greeks used the same word—*logos*—for both reason and speech: as if the essence of rational position is to be articulable in words. Shell, in effect, concedes the post-modern point that Kant’s language of purity conceals a subterranean, and perhaps sinister, motive—as when Kant claims that pure moral religion entails “the euthanasia of Judaism” (p. 325). (Compare to Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s chapter on “Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment” in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 1944.) The second lesson that Shell draws, however, is that liberals need to respect the limits of rational morality and, thus, defend certain Kantian premises—such as the bindingness of the moral law and the importance of desert—against “relativistic” or “historicist” critics such as John Rawls (pp. 5–8).

To review, the exoteric message of the book is that liberals need to fight for their core commitments (e.g., moral duty, desert), while the esoteric message is that these commitments rest upon shaky grounds. In her recent contribution to *The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss* (2009), Shell notes that the task of the social scientist “in the best sense” is to “guide liberal democracy as its friend while also alerting it . . . to the particular dangers of the present” (p. 190). Strauss and his students turned primarily to the ancients to provide the moral tonic that liberal democracy needs. In a classic counterinsurgency strategy, however, Shell co-opts Kant to remedy the “irresponsible half-heartedness” of contemporary liberal democratic politics. Her book merits a book-length response. For now, I note that Shell minimizes Kant’s call (as in his essay “What is Enlightenment?”) for *all* adults to exercise intellectual, moral, and political autonomy, even if that ultimately means overstepping Kantian limits on thinking, acting, or feeling. More importantly, Shell’s defense of autonomy in its original (Kantian) intent encumbers many groups—unforeseen or unappreciated by Kant in eighteenth-century Prussia—who want a hand in the governance of their own lives.

AMERICAN POLITICS

Out of Reach: Place, Poverty, and the New American Welfare State. By Scott W. Allard. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. 280p. \$35.00.

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— Andrea Hetting, *Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey*

Most popular conceptions of the U.S. safety net focus on public cash assistance or welfare. In his book, Scott Allard

forces his readers to think more broadly and offers a compelling case for considering the growing importance of social services, provided by public and private entities, as the most critical element of the contemporary safety net. Indeed, recent policy developments aimed at addressing poverty in the United States have changed the focus of antipoverty programs. Cash-based entitlements have been replaced with temporary assistance, coupled with service provision supporting work activities and addressing barriers such as substance abuse, low literacy, and mental

health issues. In addition, working-poor individuals not on the welfare rolls are served by other support services, such as child-care and skills training programs. Other non-working poor, such as those sanctioned from welfare, are similarly absent from welfare offices and may turn to local community centers for help.

Motivated by the centrality of social services in the modern welfare state, Allard's research examines the location, funding, and types of service providers at the community level. His book is a thorough investigation of what he calls the geography of the safety net. Its main argument is straightforward—"geography matters to the American welfare state" (p. 6). Because the location of social services greatly affects the ability of those in need to access and utilize services, "inadequate spatial access to providers is tantamount to a person's being denied assistance" (p. 6).

After Allard makes this bold claim in the introduction and urges all to consider the role of place in antipoverty programs, the second chapter provides a more detailed description of historical and recent policy developments in support of his argument. The policy history is well presented and articulately nonpartisan, and it highlights the major developments—including the current issues related to funding and faith-based organizations (FBOs)—while not boring the more informed reader. Although this movement toward supporting work and self-sufficiency through social services may be more palatable to the U.S. public, the author argues that it is also more challenging to policymakers and poses new hurdles to researchers accustomed to evaluating nationally homogeneous programs.

Allard's analyses are based on his own extensive survey data set, the Multi-City Survey of Social Service Providers (MSSSP), a key analytical component of the project and a major contribution to the field. Research on the question of service location has been limited due to the lack of reliable and accurate data on providers, their client population, and the location of services. The MSSSP overcomes this hurdle, containing recent data on about 1,500 public, nonprofit, and for-profit social service providers in three U.S. cities: Chicago, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC. The technical appendix provides a thorough explanation of the research methodology, including a full copy of the survey instrument. The discussion is straightforward and includes calculations of the analytical measures used. The main text of the book is written to a wide audience and does not bury the nontechnical reader in piles of data and computations. The appendix should satisfy those more curious about data collection and analyses.

In Chapters 3 to 5, Allard presents his findings on the spatial distribution of the safety net. In Chapter 3, service accessibility scores, based on a three-mile radius from the center of each census tract, are used to examine the extent of the mismatch between the location of providers and places where the greatest needs exist. The author finds that high-poverty neighborhoods have access to fewer

resources than low-poverty neighborhoods, and that predominately African American and Latino neighborhoods are worse-off in comparison to predominately white neighborhoods. Chapter 4 presents findings on funding sources and the extent of an agency's dependency on sole sources of support. Allard uses similar score measures and finds that geographic gaps in service provision are exacerbated by the volatility of providers. The examination of faith-based organizations in Chapter 5 demonstrates that, similar to common assumptions, FBOs are more likely to locate in high-poverty neighborhoods. Using the MSSSP, he is uniquely positioned to contribute to current policy debates about FBOs, and he responsibly investigates the differences among subgroups categorized by the extent of religious activities present in service provision.

These findings on the geography of the safety net are valuable in their own right. But Allard does not stop here. Instead, in the next chapter he examines the local political institutions that shape this situation and convincingly argues that the political fragmentation of the safety net and the siloed nature of service provision and funding impede collaboration and cooperation. The resulting competition creates incentives to minimize expenditures on service provision and limit access by residence. The vast number of actors and the extensive formal and informal opportunities to block policy initiatives often result in a slow process favoring the status quo. This political analysis provides important insights into the reasons that spatial mismatches both arise and persist.

So, what can we do to address this spatial inequality? The concluding chapter offers a number of solutions. Allard suggests increasing efforts to link those in need with existing services, by expanding public transportation, addressing housing stability, and encouraging charitable giving. Although these suggestions meet the criteria of feasibility and practicality, I found his more ambitious and comprehensive recommendations better matched with the identified institutional barriers. His discussion of "more aggressive metropolitan and regional planning for the delivery of antipoverty assistance" (p. 182) more persuasively follows from his political analysis of the limits of current efforts. But, unfortunately, this idea is insufficiently developed, and winds up lost among his other more detailed suggestions. Of course, such comprehensive planning requires that a wide range of stakeholders come to the table. Such an inclusive approach should resonate with community development scholars and advocates who are already concerned with other place-based inequalities and whose expertise, especially on place-based political inequalities and capacity building, would surely add to the conversation.

Out of Reach is thought-provoking, and the message is compelling. Allard's findings have already been recognized as major contributions to the field of policy analysis. As noted, the limited amount of empirical research in this

area is problematic in a very pragmatic sense, since non-profit and public agencies are structured to deliver services to geographic areas. The book is a critical step in filling this informational void. It provides strong, empirical evidence that the safety net is undeniably out of reach to many in need, and that the services available in poorer neighborhoods tend to be more vulnerable and less formalized. Future research should build upon this foundation, and policies and actions should be informed by it. The book ought to be read by anyone interested in poverty policy. For political scientists, practitioners, policy-makers, and frontline service providers, there is much to gain from its analysis and from its prescriptions.

Legacy and Legitimacy: Black Americans and the Supreme Court. By Rosalee A. Clawson and Eric N. Waltenburg. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008. 232p. \$69.50 cloth, \$23.95 paper.

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— Barbara A. Perry, *Sweet Briar College*

The age-old question “Does the Supreme Court follow the election returns?” entails a more recent corollary, “Can the Supreme Court shape public opinion?” In *Legacy and Legitimacy*, Rosalee A. Clawson and Eric N. Waltenburg tackle this latter query with a creative research design, sound methodology, and clearly expressed findings. In so doing, they broaden and strengthen Jim Gibson and Greg Caldeira’s landmark studies of public support for the “Third Branch.”

Clawson and Waltenburg predicate their examination of African Americans’ response to the Supreme Court on legitimacy theory, positing that diffuse support for political institutions ameliorates conflict and perpetuates the governmental system: “Because the Court enjoys remarkably high and stable levels of abstract mass approval compared with the presidency and Congress” (p. 5), “it can wrap its cloak of legitimacy around its rulings” (p. 6). For blacks, this diffuse support arises from a history of beneficial Supreme Court rulings. The book argues that by accepting the high tribunal’s decisions, blacks view the American regime as legitimate and authoritative in its policies.

One of the book’s many strengths is its multidimensional approach to answering this core question: Why do African-Americans view the Court, and thus the U.S. regime, as legitimate? The authors provide a cogent, compact summary of Civil Rights history and how blacks’ innovative public-interest-law strategy brought litigation to the federal courts. From the 1857 disaster of *Dred Scott* to the 1954 victory in *Brown*, blacks experienced court decisions that initially denied them basic human rights but, finally, awarded them full citizenship. Sometimes the justices led the nation, as in education cases; sometimes the Court followed Congress and the president, as in its validation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. By focusing on African Americans’

euphoric responses to *Brown*, especially in their content analysis of the black press, Clawson and Waltenburg offer a much-needed antidote to legal scholars’ diminution of *Brown*’s impact.

Gerald Rosenberg’s *The Hollow Hope* (1991) and Michael Klarman’s *From Jim Crow to Civil Rights* (2004) are skeptical about the Court’s ability to produce effective social reform. Yet this new book concludes quite convincingly that when Congress was mired in the segregationist mentality of senior southern legislators, the Supreme Court cloaked its rulings in legitimacy that catalyzed additional social policy to improve the life of African Americans. Moreover, the Court provided a litigation model that other social movements could follow in trying to capture their full measure of rights.

Particularly intriguing in light of President Barack Obama’s nomination of Sonya Sotomayor to the Supreme Court are Clawson and Waltenburg’s references to the contributions that representative justices can make toward legitimizing the Court in the eyes of previously marginalized groups. Thurgood Marshall ascended from leadership of the Civil Rights litigation movement to a seat on the high court, where he pursued African American interests. He exemplified both active and “descriptive” representativeness, the latter concerning who the representative is or what he or she is like, rather than what he or she does (see Barbara A. Perry, *A “Representative” Supreme Court?* 1991). Tension between the two types of representation occurs when a justice like Clarence Thomas meets the “descriptive” criterion but does not vote in favor of most blacks’ views toward Civil Rights. Clawson and Waltenburg performed a test of media framing and discovered that liberal blacks were even less supportive of recent anti-affirmative-action decisions when the media attacked Thomas (as the black media typically do). The book concludes on a cautionary note that Justice Thomas’s presence, combined with the Roberts Court’s propensity to dilute race-conscious remedies (as in the 2007 school-assignment cases), may reverse blacks’ long-held respect for the tribunal’s legitimacy.

Yet the book’s experimental, archival, and survey data present a more nuanced portrait of black attitudes toward the Supreme Court. The authors find that African Americans not only reflect a historically positive connection to the tribunal but also trust it more than the federal bureaucracy in interpreting public policy. These views then filter through racial group attitudes and media framing. Although the authors note that the experiments conducted on their campus at Purdue University are not generalizable, they also utilized national survey data to bolster their findings. The 2003 Blacks and the Supreme Court Survey provided panel data from a national representative sample of African Americans both before and after the Court decided two University of Michigan affirmative-action cases. This study allowed Clawson and Waltenburg