

Open space, house prices, and the tax base

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Abstract This paper examines the effect of public acquisitions of open space on changes in house prices and the municipal tax base using municipal-level data from New Jersey. We find that open-space expenditures yield a stream of benefits in the future but that any effect of open-space acquisitions on the tax base is immediate. Finally, we find that while higher tax rates are associated with a lower tax base, a larger tax base depresses tax rates.

JEL Classification H4 · Q3

1 Introduction

Across the US, voter interest in land conservation remains high. From 2000 to 2006, US voters considered 1,221 land conservation measures and approved 925 (76%). These measures allocated more than \$23.7 billion to land conservation. In 2006, voters considered a total of 128 open-space spending measures. About 77% of the measures passed, adding \$5.7 billion in new open-space spending authority. Owing at least in part to its high population density, New Jersey is among the most active states in pursuing land conservation. In November 2006, New Jersey counties and municipalities included 30 measures on the ballot and passed 20 (Trust for Public

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17 Land 2006). As of 2007, 231 New Jersey municipalities (41% of municipalities in the
18 state) and all 21 New Jersey counties collect open-space taxes. Annual revenues from
19 the taxes total about \$300 million. Not surprisingly, New Jersey has also preserved a
20 substantial amount of land as open space. From May 1997 to June 2007, more than
21 450,000 acres of land were preserved as open space in the State of New Jersey (about
22 9% of the land area of the state). Most of this land has been preserved through the
23 state's Green Acres Program, in which the state and municipalities mutually identify
24 parcels for acquisition. The state then considers funding for the acquisition.

25 While the value or willingness to pay for open space has received considerable
26 attention in the literature, economists have generally failed to consider the effect of
27 the acquisitions on the municipal tax base and property taxes. The oversight is sur-
28 prising. Debates about whether to allow development or to preserve a particular land
29 parcel typically center on the impact development will have on the tax base and/or the
30 tax rate. Preservation advocates assert that, via enhancement of proximate amenities,
31 open space raises property values and, hence, adds to the tax base. With a larger tax
32 base, the municipality can fund a fixed set of expenditures at a lower tax rate. Pres-
33 ervation opponents typically contend that the acquisitions are too costly and shrink
34 the tax base by removing the land from the tax base entirely or at least by limiting a
35 parcel of land's possible uses. Because the tax base is lower, preservation opponents
36 contend that tax rates must rise to compensate. Of course, the two arguments are both
37 conceptually cogent and not mutually exclusive. Thus, any determination of which
38 side of the debate is correct must be made through observation.

39 In this paper, we examine the effect of open-space acquisitions on house prices at
40 the municipal level and on municipal tax bases in New Jersey. New Jersey is highly
41 developed; as a result property values there are likely quite sensitive to open-space
42 acquisitions compared to other US states. This makes New Jersey a particularly viable
43 candidate for a study of the effect of open-space acquisitions on property values and
44 tax rates.

45 We conduct our investigation at the municipal level. First of all, New Jersey has a
46 plethora of municipal governments that set their own tax rates and land use plans.¹
47 So a viable statistical analysis should result from an analysis of its set of 566 munic-
48 ipalities. Second, open-space purchases can be made by three levels of government in
49 New Jersey—at the state, county, and municipal levels. Most municipal and county
50 expenditures are funded via property taxes. Thus, by using municipal-level data we
51 are able to capture the effect on property tax rates at the level of least aggregation.
52 The use of smaller units of areal measurement, like individual properties, could have
53 biased our analysis toward municipalities that have more properties sold in a given
54 year, either because they have a larger number of properties or because they have
55 higher property turnover rates.

56 Using properties as a focus of such investigation could lead to its own bias. Several
57 studies of housing prices outside New Jersey show that the effects of open space are
58 positive for houses in close proximity to the open space but that the effect weakens
59 with distance from the open space. Thus, there could conceivably be benefits to open

¹ In fact, in the course of our analysis we were surprised to learn that is no central electronic repository for municipal plans or even their land use/zoning maps.

60 space for certain homeowners (those that happen to live near the acquired parcel) but
61 costs for other homeowners in the form of higher property tax rates (to finance the
62 acquisition).² In addition, the benefits to the homeowners proximate to the open space
63 could conceivably be less than the costs to the non-proximate homeowners, leading to
64 a reduction in social welfare in the jurisdiction. In sum, municipalities in New Jersey
65 are sufficiently large to capture the local effects of financing the open space and also
66 of capturing most of the benefits of open space that is likely to be capitalized in home
67 ownership.

68 This study differs from the existing literature on the effects of open space because
69 it measures open space in expenditure terms rather than acreage terms, and we ana-
70 lyze house price and tax base changes over a fixed period rather than the level of
71 house prices or the tax base at a certain point in time. Our rationale for measuring
72 open space in expenditure terms is the basic economic principle open space is most
73 expensive where it is scarce and when it is most useable. In sum, its price is highest
74 where and when it is in greatest demand. Thus, a given amount of expenditure on open
75 space can buy more land in a low population density area. Similarly, land that is less
76 accessible or that has fewer possible uses, e.g., a steep ravine, is likely to have lower
77 value per acre than a piece of more readily used land in the same vicinity. In essence,
78 the public purchase of open space is likely to have smaller effects on property prices
79 when there is a lack of demand for that land. Because property prices vary across
80 locations, measuring expenditures (rather than quantity in acres) allows a more direct
81 calculation of the relative value of the benefits of the open space accruing to New
82 Jersey residents.³ (This, of course, assumes that the benefits of open-space purchases
83 attenuate mostly to properties within reasonable proximity of the open space itself.)

84 Second, we analyze house price changes rather than house price levels because
85 open-space expenditures are potentially endogenous to housing prices. That is, while
86 open-space expenditures may induce municipality property values to be higher, munic-
87 ipalities with large tax bases may be able to make larger purchases of open space. In
88 this vein, evidence of positive *changes* in home prices and the base that emanate from
89 open-space purchases make a more compelling argument for open-space purchases
90 than do higher *levels* of home prices and improved size of the base associated with
91 them. The causality does not readily flow in the opposite direction. That is, it does not
92 seem to make sense to test how property value changes from 1995 to 2000 affected
93 accumulated state and municipal open-space spending prior to 1995. Consequently,
94 we examine the impact of open-space spending (and changes in open-space spending)
95 on subsequent *changes* in house prices and *changes* in the tax base to eliminate any
96 possible endogeneity issues.⁴

² Of course, open-space acquisitions may restrain growth in municipal budgets by reducing the demand for municipal services.

³ While prospective home buyers do not know the amounts spent on open space, they often know the quantity of open space and the land values in a particular area. Use of open-space expenditure data captures both the quantity of open space and land values.

⁴ Although we do not examine municipal expenditures directly, we may infer changes in expenditures by examining changes in the tax base and the tax rate.

97 2 Background

98 2.1 House prices and open space

99 Much of the literature on open space focuses on determining the relative impact of
 100 different types of open space.⁵ For instance, the value of open space differs based
 101 on whether the parcel may be developed in the future (Irwin 2002), the types of uses
 102 currently permitted on the open space (Kline and Wichelns 1998; Geoghegan 2002),
 103 the distance between the open space and the housing unit (Bolitzer and Netusil 2000;
 104 Shultz and King 2001; Anderson and West 2006; Costanza et al. 2006), and the size
 105 of the open-space parcel.

106 Of particular interest to the current study are the findings on the effects on property
 107 value of proximity to open space. Bolitzer and Netusil (2000) and Anderson and West
 108 (2006) find that the value of open space generally declines as distance between the open
 109 space and the housing unit increases. However, parameter estimates for open space less
 110 than 100 feet from the housing unit were generally insignificant. Bolitzer and Netusil
 111 state that this is likely the result of congestion effects around public parks. Contingent
 112 valuation studies tend to yield a somewhat broader spatial extent for property value
 113 benefits of open space. On a related note, Breffle et al. (1998) find that willingness
 114 to pay (WTP) for open space decreases at decreasing rate in the distance between the
 115 homeowner's property and the open space. WTP for households 0.1 miles from the
 116 open space is twice as large as WTP for households 0.4 miles away. Also, Anderson
 117 and West find that the effect of proximity to open space on property values declines
 118 with distance from the central business district. Not surprisingly then, their findings
 119 follow those expected from Alonso's monocentric city model, i.e., that property value
 120 improvements due to proximity to open space rise with population density, income,
 121 and the fraction of the population under age 18.

122 Kline and Wichelns (1998) find that respondents placed higher values on preserved
 123 beach and cropland/pasture and lower values on turf farmland, wetlands, and wood-
 124 lands. Lutzenhiser and Netusil (2001) and Shultz and King (2001) find that natural
 125 area parks have the largest impact on home sales prices followed by golf courses,
 126 specialty parks (parks devoted to a single activity such as boating), and urban parks.
 127 These findings support our proposition that the cost of open space is associated with
 128 local preferences for and expected welfare gains from the purchased land.

129 In addition to characteristics of the open space, the literature also considers the rel-
 130 ative impact of house and homeowner characteristics on the valuation of open space.
 131 Earnhardt (2006) and Breffle et al. (1998) find that the value of open space is asso-
 132 ciated with local income levels. That is, high-income households are willing to pay
 133 more per acre of open space than are low-income households. They also found that

⁵ A rather extensive literature analyzes the effects of various urban and rural amenities on the quality of life and, hence, population and employment growth. See Mulligan et al. (2004) for a broad summary, although they also make it clear that only a very small segment of this literature examines preserved land and not the effects of its recent public purchase.

134 a community's housing attributes were also associated willingness to pay for open
135 space. Owners of older houses and houses with more interior space were also will-
136 ing to pay more for open space, even after controlling for household socioeconomic
137 characteristics.

138 [Bates and Santerre \(2001\)](#) also investigate open-space purchases. But rather than
139 estimate the impact of open space (or various characteristics of open space) on house
140 prices, they instead estimate the determinants of open space using data from Connect-
141 icut cities and towns. They find that the demand for open space is highly sensitive
142 to changes in income but relatively insensitive to changes in the price of open space.
143 Surprisingly, they found that population pressures do not affect the amount of open
144 space per capita but higher municipal populations do. This may reflect the fact that
145 older, denser municipalities have less undeveloped land (including open space) at their
146 disposal. This finding supports our use of a measure of open space in terms of its cost
147 rather than its acreage.

148 2.2 The tax base and open space

149 A number of papers hint that the higher property values associated with open space
150 may well make them self-financing ([Bolitzer and Netusil 2000](#); [Geoghegan 2002](#);
151 [Geoghegan et al. 2003](#)). That is, they suggest that more open space within a given
152 area raises local property values and, hence, property tax revenues. Thus, the
153 increased revenues due to higher commercial and residential property values in prox-
154 imity to open space may well offset the costs of purchasing and maintaining open
155 space.

156 Of course, determining whether open space is self-financing is a complicated mat-
157 ter. More open-space acquisitions imply higher property taxes, and higher property
158 taxes should lower home prices. Lower home prices, in turn, should reduce the tax
159 base. Thus following logic presented thus far, it may well be that house prices in
160 some sections of the municipality furthest from the purchased open space must fall
161 due to the rising tax rates needed to pay for the benefits of the open space obtained
162 by those closest to it. Of course, this assumes that tax revenues raised through the
163 price rises enjoyed by those closest to the open space are rather modest. The mat-
164 ter is further complicated since there must be limits to the amount of open space
165 that can be purchased before property tax revenues decline. If an entire municipality
166 becomes open space, its tax revenue are necessarily zero, and its expenditures will be
167 modest.

168 In light of all the apparent interest in the topic, the lack of attention in the literature
169 to the effect of open space on the tax rates and on the tax base is rather surprising.
170 Indeed, only a few studies estimate the determinants of municipal tax rates or the tax
171 base, and none own a particular tilt toward open space.

172 This literature finds that there is a simultaneous relation between property tax rates
173 and the property tax base. Higher property tax rates may reduce the size of the base, but
174 a larger tax base may allow municipalities to meet their budgetary requirements with
175 lower tax rates. Consequently, two key studies, a seminal one by [Ladd and Bradbury](#)
176 ([1988](#)) and another by [Brett and Pinske \(2000\)](#), estimate a simultaneous equation

177 model for tax rates and the tax base.⁶ They both model the tax base as a function
 178 of municipality characteristics and the local tax rate. They model the tax rate as a
 179 function of municipality characteristics, the tax rate at other levels of government,
 180 and the tax base. The percentage of seniors is included in the tax equation as a proxy
 181 for the demand for public services. The twist that Brett and Pinske add is one of inter-
 182 jurisdictional competition. Thus, they also include variables for tax rates at other
 183 governmental levels (i.e., the regional district), tax rates in adjoining municipalities,
 184 and characteristics of adjoining municipalities. Interestingly, their findings reveal little
 185 if any such competition.

186 3 Data and methods

187 The tax base (land and improvements) is a function of housing characteristics, neigh-
 188 borhood/locational characteristics, and land use variables. In addition, the tax base is
 189 also a function of the tax rate. Nevertheless, the tax base and the tax rate are deter-
 190 mined simultaneously (Brett and Pinske 2000; Ladd and Bradbury 1988). That is,
 191 higher property tax rates may reduce the size of the base because higher tax rates
 192 deter development and the higher tax rates are capitalized into the tax base. However,
 193 a larger tax base may allow municipalities to meet their budgetary requirements with
 194 lower tax rates.

195 Because the tax rate and the tax base are determined simultaneously, we need
 196 instruments to identify the tax rate. We use the ratio of residential to commercial land
 197 values, percentage of population that is of school age, and population as instruments.
 198 As the ratio of residential to commercial land values rises, the tax rates should rise
 199 because residents are more intensive users of municipal services. Likewise, increases
 200 in the percentage of the population that is of school age should also cause higher tax
 201 rates. The largest budget item for most municipalities is education. Finally, population
 202 may affect tax rates because of economies of scale in the provision of services. This
 203 suggests the following empirical model:

$$204 \quad R_i = f(N_i, K_i, A_i) \quad (1)$$

$$205 \quad B_i = g(N_i, K_i, \hat{R}_i) \quad (2)$$

206 where A_i are instruments used to identify the change in the tax rate, B_i is the percentage
 207 change in the tax base over the period 1995–2000), N_i is a vector of neighborhood -
 208 locational characteristics for municipality i , and K_i is a vector of land use variables
 209 for municipality i . R_i is the equalized tax rate per \$100 of property value (or the per-
 210 centage change in the tax rate over the period 1995–2000), and \hat{R}_i is the fitted value
 211 for R_i .

⁶ Lang and Jian (2004) also consider the relation between property taxes and the tax base. Their study, how-
 ever, considers the state of Massachusetts where a law limits the rate of property tax increases. Consequently,
 the law limits the endogeneity between property taxes and the tax base.

212 In the case of house prices, [Lutzenhiser and Netusil \(2001\)](#), [Shultz and King \(2001\)](#)
 213 and [Irwin \(2002\)](#) specify the hedonic residential pricing model as

$$214 \quad P_i = h(S_i, N_i, K_i) \quad (3)$$

215 where S_i is a vector of housing characteristics for municipality i . The dependent vari-
 216 able (P_i) is house sale price. However, house sale prices may also depend on tax
 217 rates. All else constant, higher property tax rates imply lower property values. How-
 218 ever, municipalities with higher house prices may require fewer services (e.g., social
 219 services) and this may depress the tax rate. This suggests that we should follow the
 220 logic for Eqs. 1 to 3 and estimate the following empirical model:

$$221 \quad R_i = j(S_i, N_i, K_i, A_i) \quad (4)$$

$$222 \quad P_i = k(S_i, N_i, K_i, \hat{R}_i) \quad (5)$$

223 While theoretical models of hedonic pricing do not specify a particular empirical
 224 model or restrictions to the functional form, [Cropper et al. \(1988\)](#) argues that linear
 225 specifications are the best method to estimate hedonic price functions. They simulated
 226 outcomes using consumers with known utility functions and found that when some
 227 house attributes are unobserved, linear, semi-log, log–log linear, and linear Box–Cox
 228 specifications performed best. We report only the semi-log linear specifications here.
 229 The linear specification generated very similar results but the fit of the semi-log spec-
 230 ification was better. Because many of the independent variables take on zero values,
 231 the log–log linear specification causes a large number of lost observations.

232 As discussed earlier in the paper, from a theoretical perspective, not only can open-
 233 space purchases alter property values, but, through the tax base, property value changes
 234 can influence the total value of open space that can be purchased. One way to avoid any
 235 possible finding of possible dual causation is to analyze the effect of prior open-space
 236 purchases on subsequent property value change.

237 To this end, we calculate the change in the mean house sale price over the period
 238 1995–2000.⁷ The data on single-family home sale prices were gathered from the New
 239 Jersey Department of the Treasury. The observations report the mean sale price by
 240 municipality for the State of New Jersey in the years 1995 and 2000. We perform a
 241 similar calculation for the tax base per acre and the equalized tax rate for New Jersey
 242 municipalities. The New Jersey Department of Community Affairs supplied the data on
 243 tax bases and equalized tax rates for 1995 and 2000. Total open-space expenditures and
 244 state open-space expenditures are compiled from files at the New Jersey Department
 245 of Environmental Protection (NJDEP). As of 2000, open-space acquisitions totaled

⁷ New Jersey is a geographically small state and consists of just two major markets: metro NYC and metro Philadelphia. To the degree that there might be different cycles in the two markets, our variables on distance from NYC and from the Northeast Corridor should capture much of it. In addition, the two markets move cyclically with a great degree of unison in part because a surprising number of people commute between the two metro areas. In the end, we see no need to be concerned about asynchronous cyclicality across housing markets in the data set we use.

246 more than 62,000 acres at a total cost of more than a billion dollars (in year 2000
247 dollars).⁸ The State of New Jersey financed about 38% of these costs.

248 NJDEP also supplied data on travel distance to New York City and Philadel-
249 phia. Municipality population, school-age population, median rooms per housing unit,
250 median family income, seasonal housing units, and the proportion of housing units
251 built before 1960 are from the US Census Bureau. Land use/land cover data is a com-
252 posite of 1995/1997 land use/land cover analysis developed by NJDEP and updated
253 for 2000 using information developed by Richard Lathrop at The Center for Remote
254 Sensing and Spatial Analysis at Rutgers University using satellite images. Data on
255 commercial and residential land values, and the ratios of assessed property values to
256 market values are from the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs. We do
257 not include housing characteristics in the tax base specifications because high-value
258 land may contain a large number of smaller housing units or a small number of large
259 (and expensive) housing units. Moreover, since we focus on house price change, we
260 want to include *any* positive changes in home prices, which include those induced
261 by differences in altered property characteristics due to proximity to an open-space
262 purchase.

263 4 Results

264 4.1 House price and open space

265 Table 1 reports means and standard deviations for the dependent (*Changes in House*
266 *Price, Changes in the Tax Base*) and the independent variables. In general, the highest
267 house prices are concentrated in two corridors: one that runs northwest of the fall
268 line between New York City and Princeton and another along the New Jersey Shore.
269 Variation in average house prices across the state was substantial; the lowest price
270 municipality was just under \$40,000 per unit (City of Camden, Camden County) and
271 the highest price municipality was over \$1 million (Alpine Borough, Bergen County).
272 There are six municipalities (of 566) that reported no house sale data for the year 2000.⁹
273 During the period from 1995 to 2000, house prices increased an average of 19.4%
274 (a simple unweighted average across municipalities) within the State (see Table 1).
275 Five municipalities reported no house sale data in 1995.¹⁰

276 We expect that higher levels of spending on open space per housing unit will
277 be associated with greater percentage increases in house prices. More open space

⁸ New Jersey also supports a farmland preservation program that acquires development rights for agricultural land. We do not have data for these acquisitions and therefore all farmland (both preserved and unrestricted) is included in our undeveloped land variable described below. Similarly, any land or development rights acquired solely by private land preservation groups are included only in the undeveloped land category and not in the open-space expenditures variable.

⁹ The missing municipalities are Audubon Park Borough; Pine Valley Borough; Tavistock Borough; Teterboro Borough; Walpack Township; and Winfield Township.

¹⁰ The missing municipalities are: Millstone Borough; Rockleigh Borough; Stockton Borough; Saddle River Borough; and Wrightstown Borough. Because six observations for 2000 are missing, a total of 11 observations are lost in measuring the 2000/1995 house price ratio.

Table 1 Means and standard deviations

Variable	<i>N</i>	Mean	Standard deviation
House price	560	210,786	139,732
Rooms	566	6.09	1.02
Average parcel	566	0.448	0.414
Pre-1960	566	49	21.1
Pct seasonal	566	4.51	12.84
Nyc Dist	566	48.05	31
NycPhl	566	81.28	17.53
Undeveloped	566	28.5	23.4
Open space exp	566	451.86	2,244.7
Tax base	566	367,860	434,501
Tax rate	566	2.52	0.792
Assessed to market	566	85.6	16.4
%Δ House price	556	19.43	20.26
%Δ Tax base	565	19.64	50.72
Tax rate ratio	566	1.076	0.2539
Residential/commercial ratio	565	7.44	12.72
Pct School age	566	25.28	4.42
Population	566	14,866	22,789

House price_{*i*} = average price per housing unit in dollars for municipality *i* in 2000

Rooms_{*i*} = median number of rooms per housing unit for municipality *i* in 2000

Average parcel_{*i*} = average residential lot size in acres for municipality *i* in 2000

Pre-1960_{*i*} = percentage of total housing units that were built prior to 1960 for municipality *i* in 2000

Pct seasonal_{*i*} = percentage of total housing units that are seasonal units for municipality *i* in 2000

Nyc Dist_{*i*} = distance (in miles) between the municipality and New York City

NycPhl = [(Distance to NYC)² + (Distance to Philadelphia)²]^{1/2}

Undeveloped_{*i*} = Undeveloped land (less acreage acquired as open space) as a percentage of total acreage as of 2000 for municipality *i*

Open space exp_{*i*} = total real open-space expenditures (in 2000 dollars) as of 2000 per housing unit for municipality *i*

Tax base_{*i*} = total assessed tax base (land and improvements) in dollars per acre for municipality *i* in 2000 multiplied by the market to assessed ratio

Tax rate_{*i*} = general property tax rate per \$100 of assessed value for municipality *i* in 2000 multiplied by the assessed to market ratio

Assessed to Market_{*i*} = ratio of total market value to assessed value expressed as a percentage for municipality *i* in 2000

%Δ House price_{*i*} = percentage change in average price per housing unit by municipality for 1995–2000

%Δ Tax base_{*i*} = percentage change in the total equalized tax base per acre by municipality for 1995–2000

Tax rate ratio_{*i*} = equalized property tax rate per \$100 of value by municipality for 2000 divided by the equalized property tax rate per \$100 of value by municipality for 1995

Residential/commercial ratio_{*i*} = ratio of residential land values to commercial land values for municipality *i* in 2000

Pct school age_{*i*} = percentage of the total population that is between the ages of 3 and 18 years of age for municipality *i* in 2000

Population_{*i*} = total population for municipality *i* in 2000

278 translates into greater amenities, and the value of the amenities is capitalized into the
 279 house price. In addition, increases in open space may restrict housing supply in certain
 280 locations and thereby raise house prices.

281 As mentioned earlier, we gauge these open-space purchases in monetary rather than
 282 acreage terms because the value of an acre of land (or an acre of open space) differs
 283 across locations. That is, an acre of land should be more valuable where residential
 284 property values are higher. Because the dependent variable is house price, we con-
 285 struct the open-space spending measure on a per-housing-unit basis. The statewide
 286 mean open-space expenditures are \$452 per housing unit. However, there is quite a bit
 287 of variation across municipalities, and about half of New Jersey municipalities have
 288 no open-space expenditures. The average cost share (a simple unweighted average
 289 across municipalities) for the state on openspace purchases is about 40%.¹¹

290 The remaining variables (*Pre-1960*, *Nyc Dist*, *Pct Seasonal*, *NycPhl*, and *Undevel-*
 291 *oped*) capture various aspects of the desirability of the location of the municipality. To
 292 capture any changes in the value of the labor market opportunities and the amenities
 293 offered by New York City, we include distance from New York City (*NYC Dist*).¹²
 294 *NycPhl* is designed to capture distance from the corridor that connects New York City
 295 and Philadelphia. It is the square root of the sum of the squared distances from the
 296 municipality to Philadelphia and New York City. We employ this because, as residents
 297 in the state, we know that properties directly on the corridor tend to have lower val-
 298 ues than those away from it due to disamenities associated with population density
 299 (e.g., traffic congestion, school quality, etc.) along this convenient corridor between
 300 two of the nation's largest cities. Thus, this variable captures changes in the value
 301 of these disamenities. We also expect that recreational opportunities associated with
 302 easy access to Atlantic beaches will raise house prices. We capture this effect with the
 303 percentage of total housing units that are seasonal (*Pct Seasonal*).

304 Using the open-space expenditures variable above, we construct two variables for
 305 each municipality: open-space expenditures per housing unit for the period 1995–2000
 306 and open-space spending per housing unit for the period 1961–1995. We interpret the
 307 first variable as the change in open-space spending and the second as initial level of
 308 open space. During the period 1995–2000, 104 municipalities had open-space expen-
 309 ditures, and the correlation coefficient between the two open-space spending variables
 310 is 0.32. From Table 1 we see that the average property tax rate increased about 7.6%
 311 over the period. We were not able to find data for the other independent variables for
 312 1995. Some of these variables are location variables that do not change at all over time
 313 (e.g., distance to New York City) and others like the percentage of housing units that
 314 are seasonal are likely to change only very slowly.

¹¹ We expected that greater state support in making open-space purchases will raise house prices because a larger fraction of the total cost will not need to be financed through local property taxes. However, this cost share was not significant explanatory variable in regressions on house prices or the tax base using the subset of municipalities ($n = 316$) that had an open-space acquisition over the period. This cost share variable is uncorrelated with the open-space spending variable ($r = -0.08$, $p = 0.12$) and its inclusion does not affect the parameter estimates on the open-space variable.

¹² Distance to Philadelphia was highly correlated with distance to New York, so we employ distance to New York in the subsequent analysis.

315 Analysis of pairwise correlations of the independent variables shows that open-
 316 space expenditures are not highly correlated with either the housing or the location
 317 variables. One problem variable is average residential parcel size (*Average Parcel*).
 318 Average parcel size is highly correlated with both *Undeveloped Land* and the *Median*
 319 *Number of Rooms* ($r = 0.66$ and 0.56 , respectively). To correct for this problem,
 320 we regress average parcel size on undeveloped land and use the residual to control
 321 for parcel size in subsequent analyses. This allows us to interpret the coefficient of
 322 *Average Parcel* as the effect of parcel size after controlling for the scarcity of land in
 323 the municipality.

324 Table 2 reports regressions on the log ratio of average house price, and the tax rate
 325 ratio. The log ratio of house prices is defined as the log of the ratio of average house
 326 sale price for 2000 to average house sale price for 1995 (by municipality). The tax rate
 327 ratio is the ratio of the equalized property tax rate in 2000 to the equalized property
 328 tax rate in 1995 (by municipality). Column 2 of Table 2 reports the results on log
 329 house price ratio assuming that the tax rate ratio is exogenous, column 3 reports the
 330 results on the tax rate ratio, and column 4 reports the results on the log house sale
 331 price ratio assuming that the tax rate ratio is endogenous. While we report estimates
 332 for all municipalities, running these analyses using only the municipalities that had an
 333 open-space acquisition yields the same basic results.

334 Tests indicate the instruments are valid. An F test of the instruments is significant
 335 ($F(2,539) = 7.71$, $p < 0.001$) and the partial R^2 of the instruments is 0.04 . In addition,
 336 tests indicate that the system is not overidentified (Hansen J Statistic = 0.734 ,
 337 $p = 0.39$). We found no evidence of spatial autocorrelation in the data. To test for
 338 spatial autocorrelation, we constructed a matrix of spatial weights based on a declin-
 339 ing exponential decay function. To test for spatial autocorrelation, we constructed a
 340 matrix of spatial weights based on a declining exponential decay function. The spatial
 341 weights matrix was constructed from X and Y coordinates for each municipality in
 342 the North American Datum 1983 State Plane projection system for New Jersey. As
 343 such, the coordinates are in feet from the central meridian and the equator. Calculation
 344 of Moran's I showed no evidence of spatial autocorrelation (Moran's $I = -0.0017$,
 345 $p = 0.35$). Calculation of the spatial autoregressive parameter (ρ) and the spatial
 346 Durbin-Watson showed similar results ($\rho = -48.8$, $p = 0.48$; $D - W = 1.0035$,
 347 $p = 0.34$).

348 *Change in Open Space Exp* is the change in open-space expenditures (i.e., open-
 349 space expenditures per housing unit 1995–2000), and its coefficient shows a consistent
 350 positive effect on the change in house prices in both specifications. In general, a one-
 351 dollar increase in open-space expenditures per housing unit from 1995 to 2000 is
 352 associated with an increase in the house prices of 0.0037% . Using the mean value
 353 of open-space expenditures 1995–2000 of $\$162$, this implies that the average house
 354 price in the state rose an additional 0.6% during the 1995–2000 period because of the
 355 open-space acquisitions during the period ($162 \times 0.0037 = 0.60$).

356 *Open Space Exp* represents the level of open-space expenditures (i.e., open-space
 357 expenditures per housing unit 1961–1995), and its coefficient shows a consistent posi-
 358 tive effect on the change in house prices in both specifications. In general, a one-dollar
 359 increase in open-space expenditures per housing unit 1961–1995 is associated with
 360 an increase in the house price ratio of 0.0025% . Using the mean value of open-space

Table 2 Regressions on the change in house prices and tax rates 1995–2000

Dependent variable:	ln(House price ratio)	Tax rate ratio	ln(House price ratio)
Constant	0.178 (0.129)	1.99*** (0.19)	0.594 (0.38)
House price 1995 ^c	-0.00038*** (0.00014)	-0.0010*** (0.00021)	-0.00056*** (0.00021)
Change in open space exp	0.000038* (0.000022)	0.000010 (0.000010)	0.000037* (0.000021)
Open space exp	0.000025*** (0.000009)	0.0000007 (0.000013)	0.000025*** (0.000009)
Nyc Dist	-0.0028*** (0.0010)	-0.000012 (0.0015)	-0.0028*** (0.0011)
Nyc Dist squared	0.000012 (0.000010)	0.0000054 (0.000014)	0.000012 (0.000010)
NycPhl	0.0036 (0.0026)	0.0022 (0.0035)	0.0038 (0.0025)
NycPhl squared	-0.000020 (0.000016)	-0.000025 (0.000022)	-0.000024 (0.000016)
Pct seasonal	0.0040*** (0.00071)	-0.0053*** (0.0012)	0.0028** (0.0013)
Pre-1960	0.00039 (0.00031)	0.00057 (0.00048)	0.00044 (0.00032)
Undeveloped	0.00013 (0.00034)	-0.00079** (0.00037)	0.00012 (0.00035)
Rooms	0.034*** (0.0090)	-0.057*** (0.014)	0.025** (0.012)
Average parcel ^a	0.072* (0.041)	-0.016 (0.043)	0.071* (0.041)
Tax rate ratio ^b	-0.105*** (0.036)		-0.29* (0.16)
Tax rate 1995	-0.060*** (0.013)	-0.28*** (0.031)	-0.11*** (0.046)
Residential/commercial ratio		0.0019*** (0.00074)	
Pct school age		0.010*** (0.0034)	
R^2	0.35	0.46	0.28
N	556	555	555

^a Residual, ^b Fitted value in col. 4, ^c In thousands

361 expenditures 1961–1995 of \$288, this implies that the average house price in the state
 362 rose an additional 0.72% during the 1995–2000 time period because of the level of
 363 open space in the municipality prior to 1995 ($288 \times 0.0025 = 0.72$). These results also
 364 do not change depending on whether the tax rate is included as a dependent variable.
 365 In addition, estimates of the effect of open-space acquisitions do not vary based on
 366 whether we include controls for the average cost share for the state.

367 If we consider only those municipalities that had an open-space acquisition over
 368 the period ($n = 104$), the estimates on the level of open-space spending rise slightly
 369 and remain significant at the 0.01 level. However, the estimates for the change in
 370 open-space spending are roughly the same, but the estimates are no longer significant
 371 ($p = 0.15$). In addition, the effect of the change in open-space expenditures per hous-
 372 ing unit on the percentage change in house prices estimate is sensitive to outliers. If
 373 we delete the 13 municipalities that had more than 60% increases in house prices over
 374 the period,¹³ the estimated effect of the change in open-space purchases 1995–2000
 375 is no longer significant. While the level of open-space expenditures (expenditures
 376 1961–1995) remains significant, the parameter estimate decreases from 0.0025 to
 377 0.0013 ($p = 0.06$). If we delete the 12 municipalities that had more than 7.0%
 378 decreases in house prices over the period, the estimated effect of both the open-space
 379 variables is unchanged. This suggests that open-space expenditures raise house prices
 380 in the long run and that the effect does not diminish over time.

381 The parameter estimates on the remaining variables suggest that municipalities that
 382 were closer to New York City had a higher median number of rooms, larger average
 383 parcel size, and a higher percentage of units that were seasonal units were associated
 384 with larger increases in average house prices over the period. A one-room increase
 385 in the median number of rooms is associated with an increase in the house price
 386 ratio of about 2.5%. A one-acre increase in the average parcel size is associated with
 387 an increase in the house price ratio of 7%. A one-mile decrease in the distance to
 388 New York City is associated with a 0.3% increase in the house price ratio. A one
 389 percentage-point increase in the number of seasonal housing units 0.3% increase in
 390 the house price ratio. Finally, there is some evidence of convergence toward the mean.
 391 Houses with higher prices in 1995 showed significantly less price appreciation over
 392 the period.

393 In both specifications, the ratio of the equalized property tax rate (*Tax Rate Ratio*
 394 = equalized tax rate 2000/equalized tax rate 1995) shows a significant negative effect
 395 on the log ratio of the house price. The estimates in column 4 show that a 0.1 increase
 396 in the tax rate ratio is associated with a 2.9% decrease in house prices over the period.
 397 If we instead treat the tax rate as exogenous, we get a smaller effect. The estimate of
 398 the effect of a purportedly exogenous tax rate ratio on the house price ratio shows that
 399 a 0.1 increase in the tax rate ratio is associated with a 1% reduction in the house price
 400 ratio. The corrected estimate thus shows an impact that is about 1.9% points greater
 401 because it removes the effect of the house prices on the tax rate. This suggests that
 402 higher house prices depress tax rates.

403 4.2 The tax base and open space

404 The average tax base per acre (a simple unweighted average) across New Jersey munic-
 405 ipalities in 2000 is \$367,860 (see Table. 1). We construct the *Tax Base* as a measure of
 406 each municipality's tax base on a per-acre basis because of the possibility that lower

¹³ Recall, while we are using municipal averages, it may be that the average house prices reported for some municipalities in a given year may be based on just a very few actual sales. Thus, such a robustness check is certainly warranted.

407 taxable acreage due to open-space acquisitions might reduce the tax base. To derive
 408 market values, we multiply the assessed tax base by the ratio of market to assessed
 409 values. In general, the highest tax bases per acre are clustered near New York City,
 410 Philadelphia, and along New Jersey's shoreline. Variation in tax bases per acre across
 411 the state was substantial; the lowest tax bases per acre were \$177 and \$716 (Walpack
 412 Township, Sussex County and Washington Township, Burlington County) and the
 413 highest tax bases per acre were \$3,347,824 and \$3,939,823 (Hoboken City, Hudson
 414 County and Guttenberg Town, Hudson County).¹⁴

415 Recall that, from a theoretical perspective, the effect of higher open-space spending
 416 on the tax base per acre of land is indeterminate. On the one hand, higher open-space
 417 expenditures are associated with higher house prices (see above). With higher house
 418 prices, the tax base is also higher. On the other hand, the acquisitions remove land
 419 from the tax rolls and thereby lower the tax base.

420 We expect that higher levels of spending on open space per housing unit will be
 421 associated with smaller percentage increases (or decreases) in the tax base. As noted
 422 above, open-space spending takes land off the tax rolls and lowers the base. During
 423 the period 1995–2000, the average percentage increase in the tax base per acre was
 424 20.84 (a simple unweighted average across municipalities) for the state (see Table 1).
 425 Table 2 reports regressions on the log ratio of the tax base and the tax rate ratio. The
 426 log ratio of tax base is defined as the log of the ratio of the market value of the tax
 427 base for 2000 to the market value of the tax base for 1995 (by municipality). *Tax Rate*
 428 *Ratio* is defined as above (the ratio of the equalized property tax rate in 2000 to the
 429 equalized property tax rate in 1995).

430 Column 2 of Table 2 reports the results on log *Tax Base Ratio* assuming that the
 431 tax rate ratio is exogenous, column 3 reports the results on *Tax Rate Ratio*, and col-
 432 umn 4 reports the results on the log *Tax Base Ratio* assuming that the tax rate ratio
 433 is endogenous. While we report estimates for all municipalities, running these analy-
 434 ses using only the municipalities that had an open-space acquisition yields the same
 435 basic results. Tests indicate the instruments are valid. An *F* test of the instruments
 436 is significant ($F(2,550) = 3.37, p = 0.03$) and the partial R^2 of the instruments is
 437 0.04. In addition, tests indicate that the system is not overidentified (Hansen *J* Statistic
 438 = 1.07, $p = 0.30$). We found no evidence of spatial autocorrelation in the data. To
 439 test for spatial autocorrelation, we once again used a matrix of spatial weights based
 440 on a declining exponential decay function. We found no evidence of spatial autocor-
 441 relation in the data. Calculation of Moran's *I* showed no evidence of spatial autocor-
 442 relation (Moran's $I = -0.0025, p = 0.99$). Calculation of the spatial autoregressive
 443 parameter (ρ) and the spatial Durbin–Watson showed similar results ($\rho = -277.7,$
 444 $p = 0.98; D - W = 1.005, p = 0.99$).

445 The change in open-space expenditures (i.e., open-space expenditures per housing
 446 unit 1995–2000) shows a consistent negative effect on the change in the tax base in
 447 both specifications. In general, a one-dollar increase in open-space expenditures per
 448 housing unit 1995–2000 is associated with a decrease in the tax base of 0.00046%.

¹⁴ Walpack Township is a special case. The Tocks Island dam (now deauthorized) was slated for construction in an area that includes Walpack Township. The expectation that the land would be inundated caused property owners to sell out. Including Walpack Township has no impact on the results.

449 Using the mean value of open-space expenditures 1995–2000 of \$162, this implies
 450 that the average tax base in the state fell 0.075% during the 1995–2000 period because
 451 of the open-space acquisitions during the period ($16 \times 0.00046 = 0.075$). If we con-
 452 sider only those municipalities that had an open-space acquisition, the estimates on
 453 the change in open-space spending remain about the same. If we delete the 16 munic-
 454 ipalities that had more than a 60% increase in the tax base over the period or the 18
 455 municipalities with more than a 7% decrease in the tax base, the estimated effect of
 456 the change in open-space purchases 1995–2000 is about the same.

457 Despite the significant effect of changes in open-space acquisitions on the tax base
 458 ratio, the level of open-space expenditures (i.e., open-space expenditures per hous-
 459 ing unit 1961–1995) shows no significant effect on the tax base ratio. This suggests
 460 that any effect of open-space acquisitions on the tax base is immediate. In essence,
 461 open-space acquisitions have the immediate effect of reducing the tax base as land
 462 is removed from the tax rolls, but older open-space acquisitions do not cause future
 463 declines in the tax base by making development less desirable.

464 In both specifications, the ratio of equalized property tax rate (tax rate 2000/tax
 465 rate 1995) shows a significant negative effect on the log ratio of the tax base over
 466 the period. The estimates in column 4 show that a 0.1 increase in the tax rate ratio
 467 is associated with a 4.2% decrease in the tax base over the period. If we, instead,
 468 treat the tax rate as exogenous, we get a smaller effect. The estimate of the effect of
 469 a purportedly exogenous tax rate on the tax base shows a 0.1 increase in the tax rate
 470 ratio is associated with a 2.6% reduction in the tax base. The corrected estimate thus
 471 shows an impact that is about 1.6% points greater because it removes the effect of the
 472 tax base on the tax rate. This suggests that the municipalities do tend to depress tax
 473 rates as the tax base rises. That is, when revenue surpluses arise, municipal executives
 474 in New Jersey do cut taxes at least somewhat rather than use the surplus revenues
 475 strictly to expand municipal services.

476 Among the remaining variables, *Pre-1960*, and *NYC Dist* show a statistically signif-
 477 icant effect on the log ratio of the tax base. Higher percentages of houses built prior to
 478 1960 were associated with decreases in the log ratio of the tax base. A one-percentage
 479 point increase in housing units built before 1960 is associated with a 0.21% reduction
 480 over the period.

481 5 Conclusion

482 Open-space programs are generally popular with voters, and a relatively large liter-
 483 ature in economics suggests why: proximity to open space raises house prices. But
 484 questions about open-space programs remain. The literature shows that the effects of
 485 open-space purchases are highest for houses nearest open space. But while open-space
 486 purchases may raise house prices for houses near the open space, they could conceiv-
 487 ably do so at the expense of other houses in the jurisdiction that are further away, by
 488 means of higher property taxes. If higher property taxes reduce house prices, as some
 489 researchers have suggested, then open-space purchases could conceivably cause the
 490 municipality's average house price to fall. In addition, open-space purchases could
 491 conceivably reduce the tax base, forcing a rise in the tax rate as the municipality must

492 finance its public services from a smaller tax base. We investigate concerns that open-
 493 space purchases harm average homeowners by reducing the available tax base and
 494 forcing a rise in property tax rates.

495 This study differs from the existing literature on the effects of open space because
 496 it measures open space in *expenditure* terms rather than *acreage* terms and we ana-
 497 lyze house price and tax base changes over a fixed period rather than the level of
 498 house prices or the tax base at a certain point in time. Because the value of an acre
 499 of land can vary radically with location, measuring open space in expenditure terms
 500 allows a more direct assessment of the net fiscal benefits of open-space purchases at the

Table 3 Regressions on the change in tax base and tax rates 1995–2000

Dep var:	ln(Tax base ratio)	Tax rate ratio	ln(Tax base ratio)
Constant	0.751*** (0.161)	1.28*** (0.164)	0.965*** (0.322)
Tax base 1995 ^c	-0.00019 (0.00015)	-0.00011*** (0.000043)	-0.00021 (0.00015)
Change in open space exp	-0.0000050*** (0.0000015)	0.0000014 (0.0000024)	-0.0000046*** (0.0000018)
Open space exp	-0.0000049 (0.000013)	-0.000021* (0.000012)	-0.0000091 (0.000012)
Nyc Dist	-0.0051** (0.0025)	-0.0013 (0.0024)	-0.0056** (0.0024)
Nyc Dist squared	0.000032 (0.000025)	0.000027 (0.000022)	0.000040 (0.000026)
NycPhl	0.0030 (0.0050)	0.0048 (0.0044)	0.0040 (0.0044)
NycPhl squared	-0.000024 (0.000031)	-0.000043 (0.000027)	-0.000033 (0.000027)
Pct seasonal	0.0020 (0.0015)	-0.0027** (0.0014)	0.0015 (0.0018)
Pre-1960	-0.0022*** (0.00079)	0.0010 (0.0083)	-0.0021*** (0.00087)
Undeveloped	-0.00053 (0.0020)	-0.00028 (0.00064)	-0.00057 (0.0020)
Tax rate ratio ^b	-0.26*** (0.056)		-0.42* (0.23)
Tax rate 1995	-0.038*** (0.014)	-0.13*** (0.039)	-0.058** (0.028)
Residential/commercial ratio		0.0019** (0.00097)	
Population ^c		0.0010** (0.00055)	
R ²	0.12	0.21	0.11
N	565	564	564

^a Residual, ^b Fitted value in col. 4, ^c in thousands

501 municipal level. We analyze house price changes rather than house price levels because
 502 open-space expenditures are potentially endogenous to housing prices. That is, while
 503 open-space expenditures may raise municipality property values, municipalities with
 504 higher house prices may be able to make larger purchases of open space.

505 We find that open-space purchases appear to induce house price rises. The level of
 506 open-space expenditures per housing unit (i.e., expenditures prior to 1995) shows a
 507 significant positive effect on the change in house prices over the period 1995–2000.
 508 We find that the average house price in the state rose an additional 0.72% during the
 509 1995–2000 time period because of the level of open space in the municipality prior
 510 to 1995 (about \$1,500). This suggests that open-space expenditures yield a stream of
 511 future benefits.

512 By contrast, the *level* of open-space expenditures (i.e., open-space expenditures per
 513 housing unit 1961–1995) shows no significant effect on change in municipal tax base
 514 between 1995 and 2000 (Table 3). Instead, the *change* in open-space expenditures
 515 (i.e., open-space expenditures per housing unit 1995–2000) shows a significant nega-
 516 tive effect on the change in the tax base. We find that the average tax base in the state
 517 fell 0.075% during the 1995–2000 period because of the open-space acquisitions dur-
 518 ing the period. This suggests that any effect of open-space acquisitions on the tax base
 519 is immediate. Therefore, unlike its benefits, the costs of open space to a municipality
 520 do not appear to spill over into future years.

521 In addition, we find that higher equalized tax rates are associated with a lower tax
 522 base, and that a rising tax base depresses tax rates. Interestingly, we also found that,
 523 ceteris paribus, rising tax rates depress the tax base. Increasing the equalized tax rate
 524 by 10% over from 1995 to 2000 reduced the tax base per acre by about 4.2% and the
 525 average house price by 2.9% over the period.

526 Because we find that changes in open-space expenditures cause reductions in the
 527 tax base, the acquisitions likely divert development activity. Future studies should
 528 attempt to evaluate the manner in which the activity is diverted. That is, future studies
 529 should attempt to determine the extent to which open-space acquisitions cause devel-
 530 opment of other greenfields in less desirable locations (or out of state), redevelopment
 531 of brownfields, more intensive use of already developed lands, and/or more efficient
 532 use of existing space.

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